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Latest Issue № 4, 2020



Archive / 2019

№ 6

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

pdfIlya Prilepskiy
8-35
 

Abstract

The paper studies the impact of external supply or “push” factors (global economic and financial indicators, oil prices, sanctions etc.) and internal demand or “pull” factors (actual and expected GDP growth rates, institutional indicators, openness indicators etc.) on private sector capital flow components (foreign direct, portfolio and other investments) and capital flow aggregates (gross capital inflow and outflow, net capital inflow) in the Russian case, based on regressions utilizing 1994–2018 quarterly data. Among the external factors, the VIX volatility index, the real effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar and the sanction intensity index prove to be consistently significant. The impact of sanction shocks is found to weaken over time, probably reflecting adaptation to sanctions. Among the internal factors, only the expected GDP growth rates prove significant. In contrast to existing literature on emerging markets as a whole, no significant impact of the interest rate and GDP growth differentials (with respect to advanced economies) is established. It is demonstrated that the push factors account for the larger share of explained variance of gross capital inflow and outflow as well as net capital inflow. In addition, capital flow volatility indicators are analyzed, with positive correlations found for the VIX index, the U.S. interest rates, the oil price volatility, and the financial account openness index.

Keywords: capital flows, volatility, foreign direct investment, sanctions, regression analysis.

JEL: F21, F32.

Ilya V. Prilepskiy, Cand. Sci. (Phys.-Math.). Economic Expert Group (15/13, str. 5, Petrovka ul., Moscow, 107031, Russian Federation); Financial Research Institute (3, str. 2, Nastas’inskiy per., Moscow, 127006, Russian Federation).

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pdfIrina Gurova
36-61
 

Abstract

In the present paper the determinants of the inward FDI stock in the Russian economy have been estimated via panel data analysis. The results of the study have confirmed the relevance of basic gravity determinants: the GDP of Russia and the investing countries, and the distances between them. The level of per capita income in the investing country, as well as the mutual trade, has a robust positive effect on the inward FDI stock. This allows one to assert that an increase in trade in goods with countries with growing levels of wealth leads to an increase in stocks of foreign investment in the Russian economy. Changes in the exchange rate, relations with offshore financial centers, restrictions and sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014, and bilateral investment treaties do not have a significant impact on FDI accumulated in the country. The provision that trade in goods has a positive effect on the FDI stock can contribute to further study of FDI round-tripping and Russia’s involvement. The steady dependence revealed at the macroeconomic level shows that, despite the high estimates of the scale of intermediary financial investments, the FDI accumulated in the Russian economy retains the link with real economic activities. At the microeconomic level, it is provided by activities of TNCs and their long-term interest in the economy of invested enterprises, in the growth of their efficiency and competitiveness.

Keywords: gravity equation, inward FDI stock, FDI round-tripping.

JEL: F21, F23.

Irina P. Gurova, Dr. Sci. (Econ.). Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (76, Vernadskogo pr., Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation).

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LAW AND ECONOMICS

pdfAnna Zolotareva
62-81
 

Abstract

The draft law on the inclusion of several of the largest non-tax charges in the Tax Code, published in November 2018, was formally developed in response to the request of the business community to streamline the legislative regulation of mandatory public payments similar to taxes and fees, but not provided for by the Code. However, the business community has been opposing this bill. The article discusses the practical reasons for the rejection of the bill by entrepreneurs, as well as the criticism of the bill from the point of view of tax law theory. According to the author, the main theoretical shortcomings of the bill are the lack of a systemic approach to the incorporation of non-tax charges into the Tax Code, and the erosion of the content of such basic concepts for tax law as tax and fee. From a practical point of view, the main drawback of the bill appears to be the fact that the tightening of the rules of administration of non-tax payments associated with their incorporation into the Tax Code (that is, the transition to the undisputed recovery of arrears, penalties and fines associated therewith, and the introduction of criminal liability for non-payment thereof) is not accompanied by any compensatory measures. Criticism of the bill’s provisions is complemented by specific proposals by the author to improve it. In addition, it is concluded that the inclusion of certain non-tax charges in the Tax Code does not negate the need for legislative regulation of the rules for the establishment and collection of all mandatory public payments.

Keywords: non-tax charges, quasi-tax charges, parafiscal charges, codification of non-tax charges, environmental tax.

JEL: Н25, K34.

Anna B. Zolotareva, Cand. Sci. (Law). Institute of Applied Economic Research, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (84, pr. Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119571, Russian Federation); Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (str. 1, 3–5, Gazetnyу per., Moscow, 125009, Russian Federation).

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REGIONAL ECONOMICS

pdfRinat Khasanov, Anna Korableva
82-101
 

Abstract

The paper discusses a comprehensive approach to assessing regional economic security based on three main areas of regional development: the state of the region’s economy, its social sphere, and its finance. The present article is aimed, first of all, at presenting the practical possibilities of using the economic security index for tasks such as identification of regional problems and assessment of the actions of regional authorities. For this purpose, the authors introduce a definition of regional economic security, the principle of calculating the integral index, and the method of assessing economic security. The practical aspects of measuring regional economic security on the basis of the proposed integral index are considered. The mathematical apparatus for calculating the integral index of economic security allows one to study regional development in dynamics, and to build reasonable models and forecasts, which makes it possible to approach the problem of regional development much more objectively in terms of government resource distribution. In this connection, it is proposed to use the method of forming and evaluating the integral index of economic security as a key tool of regional management, namely as a method of assessing the quality of management; assessing the consequences of decisions; identifying the lagging areas of economic, social or financial spheres of a region; and forecasting socio-economic development for individual regions and federal districts.

Keywords: regional economic security, economic security indicators, regional management quality assessment, regional development forecasting.

JEL: R58, C43.

Rinat Kh. Khasanov, Cand. Sci. (Econ.). Institute of Digital Economy, Yugra State University (16, Chekhova ul., Khanty-Mansiysk, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug — Yugra, Tyumen Region, 628012, Russian Federation).

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Anna А. Korableva, Cand. Sci. (Econ.). Omsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (15, Karla Marksa pr., Omsk, 644024, Russian Federation).

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PUBLIC FINANCE

pdf
102-115
 

Vito Tanzi, Honorary President, International Institute of Public Finance (Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany).

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Yuriy V. Kuznetsov, Cand. Sci. (Econ.). Financial Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (3, str. 2, Nastas’inskiy per., Moscow, 127006, Russian Federation); Editorial Board of the Journal “Economic Policy” (3–5, str. 1, Gazetny per., Moscow, 125009, Russian Federation).

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Elena I. Andreeva. Financial Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (3, str. 2, Nastas’inskiy per., Moscow, 127006, Russian Federation).

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ECONOMIC HISTORY

pdfAndrei Belykh

116-135


 

Abstract

The article poses the task of creating a financial history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Communist Party existed from 1898 to 1991. Though communists declared commitment to Marxism, which acknowledged the precedence of material factors over ideology and policy, the role of finances in the party’s history received little attention. After 1991, the situation in this field remained practically the same. The lack of scientific history generates mythology. The author demonstrates that one of such myths is the concept that the revolution of 1917 was a success thanks to the Bolsheviks having “German money”. The article analyzes the issue of Germany financing the Bolsheviks from the banking point of view. The existing hypotheses of how exactly the Bolsheviks were receiving money are considered. The main “anti-Bolshevik” version implies that finances were being transferred to the Bolsheviks under the guise of operations of an import/export firm, whose representative in Russia was Evgeniya Sumenson. The author investigates three cases which are of prime importance for all these hypotheses: Alexander Parvus’s money, the telegrams intercepted by the French counterintelligence, and the so-called “Sisson Documents”. Based on the analysis of the works of Russian and foreign historians and also on the published archive materials, the author concludes that all the documents currently available do not support the “anti-Bolshevik” version. Moreover, they prove that money movement was backwards: the proceeds from the sales of goods imported into Russia were transferred to Europe. Operations carried out by Sumeson were of a purely commercial nature and were quite in line with the banking practice of that period. The true financial history of the Bolsheviks and the CPSU as a whole is yet to be written. One of such successful investigations is John Biggart’s article on the Nikolai P. Shmit bequest.

Keywords: financial history, Bolsheviks, “German money”.

JEL: N23, P24, P34.

Andrei A. Belykh, Dr. Sci. (Econ). Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (82, Vernadskogo pr., Moscow, 119571, Russian Federation).

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pdfJohn Biggart
136-171
 

Abstract

This article is part of a larger study that deals with Bolshevik finances during the years 1905–1914. Since Martov (Spasiteli ili uprazdniteli, 1911), most accounts of the finances of the Bolshevik fraction of the RSDRP have formed part of an anti-Leninist narrative in which the methods of the Bolsheviks have been likened to those of a Camorra. I focus instead on the technical (including legal) aspects of the origin, management and mismanagement of Bolshevik finances, and on the connection between funding, policy, and fractional divisions. In many accounts of the Shmit affair, it is claimed that Nikolai P. Shmit intended his bequest for the RSDRP as a whole, and that his sisters, Ekaterina and Elizaveta Pavlovna, were naive accomplices in the diversion of the funds towards the Bolsheviks. I argue, on the contrary, that in the absence of a written document, both sisters strove conscientiously to execute their brother’s will as they understood it, even when, on occasion, this meant defying the wishes of the Bolshevik beneficiaries. In this article, I attempt to provide a precise characterization of the “Shmit bequest”, and draw a distinction between the “bequest” and the entire estate of Nikolai Pavlovich (a distinction that the Bolsheviks were reluctant to acknowledge). Concentrating upon the realization of the portion of Ekaterina Pavlovna, I describe the priority claims that she made upon the bequest, and explain why recourse was ultimately made to an arbitration panel (treteiskii sud). I examine the extent to which the proposals of the arbitration panel were implemented, and conclude with an estimate of the proportion of the Shmit bequest that was eventually realized by the Bolsheviks. Realization by the Bolsheviks of the portion of Elizaveta Pavlovna, which extended over several years, requires separate attention.

Keywords: RSDRP, N. P. Smit bequest, Bolshevik finances.

JEL: N23, Z10.

John Biggart, PhD (Hist.). University of East Anglia (Norwich Research Park, Norwich, Norfolk, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom).

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